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During the past decade there has been a strong trend toward eco-
nomic interdependence among the industrial countries. This growing
interdependence makes the successful pursuit of national economic ob-
jectives much more difficult. Broadly speaking, increasing interde-
pendence complicates the pursuit of national objectives in three ways.
First, it increases the number and magnitude of the disturbances to
which each country's balance of payments is subjected, and this in
turn diverts policy attention and instruments of policy to the restora-
tion of external balance. Second, it slows down the process by which
national authorities, each acting on its own, are able to reach their
domestic objectives. Third, the response to greater integration can
involve the community of nations in counter-acting motions which
leave all countries worse off than they need be. These difficulties are
in turn complicated by the fact that the objective of greater economic
integration involves international agreements which reduce the num-
ber of policy instruments available to national authorities for pursuit
of their economic objectives. This article touches on all of these facets
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of higher economic interdependence among industrial nations, both as
a fact and as an objective, but its principal focus is on the third com-
plication-the process of mutually damaging competition among na-
tional policies.
There can be little doubt about the great growth in international
economic interdependence over the last two decades. Import quotas in
industrial countries have been virtually abolished on trade in manu-
factured products, tariffs have been reduced, and transportation costs
have fallen relative to the value of goods. At the same time, the accumu-
lation of capital and the spread of technology have made national
economies more similar in their basic characteristics of production;
comparative cost differences have apparently narrowed, suggesting that
imports can be replaced by domestic production with less loss in
national income than heretofore. Whether a country imports a partic-
ular good or exports it thus becomes less dependent on the basic
characteristics of the economy, more dependent on historical develop-
ment and on relatively accidental and transitory features of recent
investment decisions at home and abroad. An invention in one country
may lead to production there for export, but the new product will
relatively quickly be produced abroad-or supplanted by a still newer
product-and possibly even exported to the original innovating coun-
try.
Monetary disturbances, too, are likely to be much more quickly
translated into changes in the volume of exports and imports than they
were formerly. Under fixed exchange rates, greater than average
monetary inflation in one country will invite a more rapid deterioration
in the balance on goods and services than was true in the past.
Enlargement of the decision-making domain of the world's great
producing firms results in the rapid movement of capital and technical
knowledge across national frontiers, thereby contributing to the nar-
rowing of comparative cost differences; but their activity will also
quicken the speed with which trade adjusts to new sales opportunities
because they have direct knowledge of foreign markets and access to
distribution channels.1
Finally, as financial markets become more closely integrated, rela-
tively small differences in yields on securities will induce large flows
of funds between countries. Banks will increasingly number "foreign"
1. A quick response assumes the absence of collusive agreements on price, market-
sharing, and the like.
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firms among their prime customers; the advantages of inexpensive
credit to firms in countries with ample savings and well-functioning
financial markets, such as the United States, will be shared increasingly
with firms elsewhere.
All of these changes in the characteristics of the international econ-
omy during the past decade-and it should be emphasized that
economic integration is still far from complete-are crucial to the
functioning of the international payments system and the autonomy
which it permits to national economic policy formation. These changes
mean that in normal periods prospective imbalances in international
payments-imbalances which would arise if countries did not respond
to reduce them or did not adjust policy measures to forestall them-
are likely to be more frequent and of larger amplitude than they have
been in the past. "Disturbances" arising from new innovations, from
generous wage settlements leading to price increases, and from excess
or deficient domestic demand will affect the balance of payments more
perceptibly. Whether or not imbalances also last longer depends upon
the relationship among the "disturbances"; if they are well distributed
among countries and tend equally toward deficit or surplus, the dura-
tion of prospective imbalances may well be less than in the past;
otherwise it may be longer.
These changes suggest that balance of payments difficulties are likely
to be more common in the future, and that they will worsen as the
structural changes continue in their recent trend. By the same token,
however, correction of imbalances in international payments should be
easier in the future. Trade flows will respond more sharply to given
small "disturbances"; but they should also respond more quickly to
policy measures designed to influence them. If a small relative increase
in the price level will lead a national economy into greater balance of
payments difficulties than heretofore, a relatively small decrease should
undo the difficulties. Similarly, international capital flows will respond
more rapidly to small differences in national credit conditions; but
small differences in national credit conditions directed to correcting the
imbalance can induce equilibrating flows of capital. Thus if the na-
tional authorities can recognize disturbances early, are willing to use
some of the tools at their disposal for correcting imbalances in inter-
national payments, and act reasonably quickly in doing so, then
the increased sensitivity of international payments to various dis-
turbances need cause no undue difficulty-provided that policy instru-
ments are properly chosen and adequately coordinated among coun-
tries.
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Interdependence Before 1914
There is a natural inclination to compare the international economy
today, especially under the claim that it is becoming more integrated,
with the international economy before 1914, when, it is often said, the
world was highly "integrated" economically. In the four decades before
World War I most of the major countries were on the gold standard
(implying fixed exchange rates) most of the time, capital was free to
move into or out of most countries, trade was impeded only by com-
paratively moderate tariffs and quotas were generally absent. Even
labor was generally free to migrate from country to country without
visas, security checks, and immigration quotas.
In one important sense, however, the comparison is not at all apt.
Today national governments are much more ambitious about the ob-
jectives of national economic policy than they were in the 19th century.
Governments have taken on the responsibility for assuring high levels
of employment and, increasingly, a rapid rate of growth; and they
attempt actively to influence the allocation of resources and the dis-
tribution of income to a much greater degree. These new tasks place
greater burdens on the available instruments of policy. Before 1914,
by contrast, preoccupation with "defending the currency" was domi-
nant, and the (admittedly more limited) policy instruments at hand
were more willingly devoted largely toward that end. Thus the in-
trusion of international economic integration on national economic
policy was more readily accepted because national economic policy was
far less ambitious in its aims.
In addition to this important difference, economic relations among
industrial countries are probably potentially much closer today than
they were even before 1914, despite the characteristics of the pre-1914
world noted above. True, British and French capital moved overseas
readily and British investors built railroads around the world. The
proportion of Britain's annual savings which went abroad was stagger-
ing by modem standards. 2 Nonetheless, communications were far less
perfect than they are today and foreign investors ran far greater com-
mercial risks arising from imperfect knowledge (except in the case of
colonial bonds which in effect had the sponsorship of the home govern-
ment).
2. A. CAIRNcROSS, HOME AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1870-1913, 104-06 (1953) estimates
that in 1907 no less than 40 per cent of British national saving went to foreign invest.
ment.
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Despite the freedom of capital to move, it did not in fact move in
sufficient volume to erase differences even in short-term interest rates.
Over the period 1876-1914 short-term interest rates in New York
averaged more than one percentage point higher than corresponding
rates in London and there was only a weak correspondence in move-
ment between short-term rates in the two financial centers. Short-term
interest rates in London and Paris were much closer together and the
correspondence in their movement was higher but still far from per-
fect.3 Long-term interest rates showed similar divergence in their levels
and movement. Response to new investment opportunities was often
slow when it came at all. 4
While tariffs were generally low, barriers to trade in the form of trans-
portation costs were very substantial, although they declined sharply
after the introduction of the ocean steamship. Large differences in
comparative costs meant trade was socially very profitable, but the
composition and level of trade was correspondingly less sensitive to
small changes in costs, prices, and quality. Finally, business organiza-
tions, far from being international, became truly national corporations
in the United States only as World War I approached, and the process
was even slower in many European countries.
Thus the alleged integration of the pre-1914 world economy was
something of an illusion. While the pre-1914 world was "integrated"
in the sense that government-imposed barriers to the movement of
goods, capital and people were minimal,5 those imposed by nature were
much greater and economic integration was not high in the sense used
here-quick responsiveness to differential earning opportunities.
Countries today are gradually entering a new environment, not
merely returning to a state which had once existed. And they confront
new problems arising from the combination of more ambitious national
and international economic objectives and a higher degree of economic
interdependence than has ever existed before. How, in this world, are
they to maintain international equilibrium under a regime of fixed
3. See 0. AORGENsrERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRNsAcrio.vs AND BUSmuEss CYCEMs
(1959) for an exhaustive study of interest rate movements in the 19th century. The correla-
tion coefficient between monthly averages of the commercial paper rate in New York and
the open market discount rate in London was only +.45; the correlation between open
market discount rates in London and Paris was +.67. Simple correlations of short-term
interest rates in New York, London, Paris, and Berlin can be found at p. 109.
4. Morgenstern considers it "remarkable" that such permanent differences could be
maintained for hundreds of months; "the interaction of all these highly organized money
and capital markets and the vast flows of funds back and forth was not strong enough
to overcome fundamental institutional and risk differences." Id. at 470.
5. This is the definition used in B. BLAssi., THE TnEoRY OF EcoNouc INrEGUATION
(1961).
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exchange rates and at the same time achieve their national objectives?
It is now necessary to specify more precisely how conflicts may arise
and to indicate some of the ways in which governments have re-
sponded to these conflicts.
Economic Objectives and Policy Instruments
A well-known proposition in the theory of economic policy requires
that the number of policy instruments be at least as great as the number
of objectives (target variables) if all objectives are to be achieved.' If
the number of instruments is fewer than the number of targets, it will
not be possible to reach all of the targets; in that case at least some
targets must be given up, and the authorities must choose among
them.7
A simple example can illustrate the need to have at least as many
instruments as targets. Suppose the government of an isolated country
has two economic objectives: it would like to assure full employment
of its labor force at all times, and it would like its national product to
grow at a specified rate each year. It can vary the overall size of the
budget deficit or surplus (fiscal policy) to assure full employment. But
full employment of resources can be met with a variety of combinations
of investment, consumption, and government expediture. Without
some other instrument, the desired growth rate cannot be assured. If,
6. A useful framework for the discussion of economic policy has been provided by ie
Dutch economist, Jan Tinbergen. He draws a distinction among three types of economic
variables: target variables, instrument variables, and data. Target variables are those to
the values of which we attach some social importance per se, e.g., unemployment or the
growth in per capita income. Instrument variables, or policy instruments, are those
which the public authorities can manipulate directly in order to influence the target
variables. Data are other economic variables which influence the target variables. If
an economy starts from a position "on target," that is, with all of its target variables
where the authorities want them, then changes in the data are "disturbances" and call
for some adjustment in the policy instruments in order to restore the desired values of
the target variables. See J. TINBERGEN, ON THE THEORY OF EcoNoIc PoaCY (1952); J.
TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN (1956).
7. In general, it will be desirable to have more instruments than there are targets. This
is especially true where the relationships between instruments and targets are not well.
known. More often than not, policy-makers are quite confident about the dircction In
which a given change in a policy instrument will affect the target variables, but they are
not at all confident about the extent of the influence. This may be due to simple ignorance
about an economy with fairly stable structural relationships, or it may be due to a rapid
change in the structure of the economy.
In the presence of this uncertainty, it is desirable to have as many policy instruments
as possible. None of them will be superfluous, for all can help to keep the target variables
as close as possible to their targets. Each instrument variable should be used in proportion
to the confidence held in its relationship to the target variables. For a formal analysis of
this problem, see Brainard, Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Economic Policy, 57
AmERICAN ECONOMIC REviEw (May 1967).
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however, investment leads to more growth, then monetary policy and
fiscal policy together can be manipulated to achieve the two objectives.
The higher the growth rate desired, the lower should be the rate of
interest. Fiscal policy can then be adjusted to assure full employment.
This very simple model apparently influenced thinking in the early
years of the Kennedy Administration.
Viewing economic policy as a problem in specifying targets and
finding sufficient instruments to reach them helps to illuminate many
policy problems confronting national authorities. The objective of
greater economic integration has led many officials to reject both flex-
ible exchange rates and frequent variations in fixed exchange rates as
instruments for maintaining balance of payments equilibrium. A
number of other instruments of policy have been ruled out by inter-
national agreement on the same grounds, or to avoid a round of retalia-
tion and counter-retaliation that would leave all countries worse off
than they were at the outset. Most types of export subsidies, tariff dis-
crimination among countries, increases in tariffs, and discriminatory
exchange regulations fall into this category. A number of provisions
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are devoted
to these exclusions and prohibitions; with specified exceptions, such as
the formation of customs unions or free trade areas, trade discrimina-
tion is proscribed.8 So are many types of export subsidies and discrimina-
tion in domestic taxation between home and foreign goods. The
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund make
similar prohibitions with respect to currency arrangements. The ex-
tensive use of these measures in the past, especially in the 1930's, led
to widespread retaliation and mutual recriminations, and they acquired
a bad name among outward-looking officials. But the price of interna-
tional rules of good behavior as set forth in the GATT and the IMF
Articles has been a reduction in the range of instruments available to
national policy-makers. 9
Some usable policy instruments may be used, as a practical matter,
only within a limited range. In the United States changes in the dis-
8. Trade discrimination is also permitted, under Art. XIV of the GATT, when currency
discrimination is permitted under the rules of the International Monetary Fund. That
occurs if the IMF dedares a particular country's currency is "scarce" under its Scarce
Currency Clause. No such finding has ever been made, even during the period of severe
dollar shortage of the late 1940's.
9. Freedom to use some of these instruments may in any case have been more apparent
than real. As noted below, export subsidies in one country raise exports only if other
exporting countries do not also use them, or if importing countries do not offset them
with higher duties. But that is precisely what happened in the interwar period.
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count rate of the Federal Reserve System and (since 1962) deliberate
deficits or surpluses in the government budget are both regarded as
legitimate tools of economic policy; but in normal times the public is
not likely to countenance a discount rate of 20 per cent or a budget
deficit of $50 billion. These exceed the range of acceptability; policy
instruments have "boundary conditions." In the abnormal situations
when such limits become operative, they withdraw an instrument from
use. Sometimes these limits are not fully known until they are tested;
then we discover that we have more targets (or fewer instruments) than
were previously apparent.
It goes without saying that to be attainable economic objectives
must be consistent. If they are not consistent, no number of policy
instruments will be sufficient. One illustration in the forefront of dis-
cussion in most industrial countries involves the relationship between
employment and price stability. Given the institution of private col-
lective bargaining, is the target of "full employment" (4 per cent un-
employment in the United States, under 2 per cent in the United
Kingdom, each by its own standards and definitions) consistent with
"price stability," defined, say, as stability in the consumer price index?
Many economists would find a conflict.
This kind of inconsistency can perhaps be overcome by developing
new policy instruments.10 Another kind of inconsistency, especially
important to national economies linked through international trade
and capital movements, cannot be eliminated through the development
of new instruments. Examples are objectives regarding the balance of
payments or the trade balance. Since one country's trade surplus is
another country's trade deficit, it is impossible for all countries to
succeed in running trade surpluses. The same is true for balance of
payments, taking into account capital movements.1 If there are n
countries, only n - 1 of them can succeed in achieving their inde-
pendent balance of payments targets; 12 at least one must accept defeat
or else fail to target values for its trade position and its balance of pay-
10. These new instruments would involve shifting the trade-off between unemployment
and price inflation--called the Phillips Curve-enough to make simultaneous attainment
of the two objectives feasible. This is the thrust of "incomes policies."
11. This assumes that national definitions concerning the balance of payments are all
consistent, and abstracts from the additional complications created by disparate national
definitions of balance of payments "deficit" and "surplus." See Host-Madsen, Asymmetries
Between Balance of Payments Surpluses and Deficits, IMF, in 9 STArr P"AERs 182-201
(1962).
12. Unless, of course, the targets all happen to be consistent, e.g., if the sum of all
balance of payments targets happened to add to the annual addition to monetary gold
stocks.
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ments position, thereby acting as an international residual. It has been
suggested that the United States played this role until the late 1950's,
by taking a relatively passive position toward its payments position
after the termination of Marshall Plan aid.13
The requirement of consistency is not merely theoretical. In 1962,
for instance, all of the major industrial countries wanted simultaneously
to improve their payments positions on current account. While mutual
success was not logically impossible in this case, it did imply a corre-
spondingly sharp deterioration in the current account position of the
less developed countries taken together, which in turn would require
ample financing from the industrial countries in the form of grants
or loans. No such increase in capital movements was targeted. Thus
national targets were inconsistent.' 4
The Speed of Adjustment
In summary, successful economic policy requires an adequate number
of policy instruments for the number of economic objectives, and it
requires that these objectives be consistent with one another. If either
of these conditions fails, policymakers are bound to be frustrated in
their efforts. Before turning to how these frustrations become manifest,
however, one other point should be made: growing interdependence
can slow down greatly the process by which independently acting
national authorities reach their economic objectives, even when all the
targets are consistent and there are sufficient policy instruments at
hand to reach them. Thus in practice nations may find themselves
further from their objectives than would be true with less interde-
pendence.
High interdependence slows the speed of adjustment to disturbances
if national policy-makers do not take the interdependence into account.
This is because the economic authorities in different countries may be
working at cross purposes. An investment boom in one country may
raise interest rates both at home and, by attracting internationally
mobile funds, in neighboring countries. The first country may tern-
13. Polak, International Coordination of Economic Policy, IMF, in 9 STArr P"rns 199
(1962). The ability of the United States to take a passive position ended around 1959,
when the deficit became very large and foreign officials began to call for correction. One
interpretation which can be put on the international discussions to establish machinery
for creating international liquidity is that it represents a search for a new residual supplier
in the international payments system.
14. Triffin has underlined the dramatic inconsistencies in balance of payments targets
in the early 1960s. See R. TPIrriN. Tim WORLD MONEY LUAE 118-32 (1966).
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porarily welcome the high interest rates to help curb the boom and may
also tighten fiscal policy to keep inflationary pressures in check. But
the other countries may fear that higher interest rates will deter in-
vestment at home and take steps to lower interest rates. Unless this
monetary relaxation is taken into account in framing fiscal policy in
the first country, its authorities will find that fiscal policy has not been
sufficiently contractionary. But more contractionary fiscal policy will
tend to hold up interest rates, so that the monetary authorities in the
neighboring countries will find they have only been partially successful
in lowering their rates. Even if in the end the whole process settles to a
point where the various national authorities are satisfied, it will have
taken longer than if there had been close coordination between the
authorities in the several countries involved. The greater the inter-
actions between the countries, the longer convergence will take if
countries act on their own.
Sometimes, of course, actions in a neighboring country can reinforce
those taken at home. If in the above example the domestic investment
boom transmitted inflationary pressures to a neighboring country
through enlarged imports, then contractionary fiscal policy there would
complement contractionary fiscal policy at home. But in this case failure
to take into account the interactions between the two countries may
lead to over-correction and excessive unemployment. This will arise if
the authorities in each country decide how much they have to act when
acting alone to restore equilibrium; then when both groups act, the
total effect will be excessive.
If policy decisions are truly decentralized among nations, in the sense
that the authorities in each nation pursue only their own objectives
with their own instruments without taking into account the interactions
with other countries, then the more interdependent the international
economy is, the less successful countries are likely to be in reaching and
maintaining their economic objectives. This is due to the greater im-
pact of domestic measures on foreign economies, calling forth corre-
spondingly greater offsetting responses which in turn affect the first
country. Under these circumstances, countries must either reconcile
themselves to prolonged delays in reaching their objectives or they
must coordinate their policies more closely with those of other na-
tions.1 5
15. These ideas are complex and are best stated somewhat more formally in a technical
footnote.
In matrix notation, let y = Ax describe the relationship between target variables ()
and small changes in policy instruments (x), the matrix A = [ajj], where aj indicates the
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It has of course long been true that small countries must watch
closely economic developments and policies in their larger neighbors,
and they would take these developments into account. For the Nether-
lands, forecasting German GNP and German economic policies is a
critical component to forecasting Dutch GNP. But as economies grow
more interdependent, the importance of two-way interactions in-
creases, so that economically large countries such as Britain, Germany,
and even the United States must increasingly take into account de-
velopments and policies abroad.
International Competition in Economic Policy
In an interdependent economy, governments do not have full control
over the instrument variables needed to influence the trade balance or
the balance of payments. Each government can affect the domestic
interest rate in an attempt to influence international capital movements
or can set tariffs on imports and subsidies on exports to influence the
impact of instrument x, on target y,. Arrange the variables so that all the targets and
instruments of one country are grouped together, followed by those of another, etc.
A can thus be partitioned, with blocks representing individual countries running along the
diagonal, and blocks representing the degree of interdependence, or interaction between
the instruments of one country and targets of another, lying off the block diagonal.
Suppose that y* represents the target values the economic authorities of the various
countries would like to reach, that the targets are all consistent, and that there are enough
policy instruments to reach them all, giving the authorities the correct values for these
instruments, x = A-1yO.
Suppose now that the target variables take on values different from their targets. How
do the authorities react? Their reaction functions might be described by the following set
dN
of differential equations, - = B(y*-y) = B(y*-Ax), which sa)s that the authorities
change their instruments at a rate which depends on how far the target -ariables are from
their targets. If they do not take into account international interdependence, B, the
matrix of reaction coefficients, will be a diagonal or block diagonal matrix, indicating
that each policy-maker looks only at his own target(s).
The solution to this system of linear differential equations takes the form:
YJMt = YJ" + MKIJ e -- l".
I
where the Xi are the characteristic roots of BA and the KIJ are constants determined by
the initial disturbances. For a policy system which works in the sense that y,(t) will grad-
ually approach yj, the second term on the right is transitory. The system will be more
efficient, ie. achieve the policy targets more rapidly after any disturbance, the more
rapidly this term fades away. It will fade more rapidly the larger are the ),.
In general, the larger the off-diagonal elements are relative to the diagonal elements,
Le. the higher the degree of ignored interdependence, the smaller the smallest root will
be and the longer it will take after any given disturbance to reach the target values yo
High interdependence which is ignored gives rise to the possibility of overshooting targets
several times, and it even gives rise to the theoretical possibility that targets will not be
reached at all until the nature of the adjustment process is changed.
Coordinating economic policy involves not only exchanging information on targets and
use of instruments, but taking this information into account when using instruments.
Convergence to targets is then much faster.
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trade balance. But success in influencing capital movements or trade
flows depends on what other countries are doing. It is interest rate
differentials, not the absolute level of interest rates, which induce the
movement of capital. And it is domestic tariffs less foreign subsidies
which influence the level of imports. There are many instruments of
economic policy for which relative differences affect international
transactions, but where the absolute value may continue to exert a
strong influence on purely domestic decisions. This is true, for ex-
ample, not only of short- and long-term interest rates, but also of
liberal tax benefits to investment, generous depreciation allowances,
lax regulation of corporate activities and a host of other measures
designed to influence corporate location. It is also true of foreign
trade: generous credit arrangements or credit-risk guarantees for ex-
ports may encourage total exports without improving the trade balance
if other countries are pursuing similar measures.
This feature of policy instruments-that the absolute level of the
instrument may have important effects domestically, but that only the
level relative to that in other countries influences the balance of trade
or payments-raises the question: where do the values of these instru-
ments finally settle? International capital movements between two
otherwise isolated countries will presumably be roughly the same
whether interest rates are at 7 per cent in one and 5 per cent in the
other or at 4 per cent in the first country and 2 per cent in the second.10
In each case the differential is two percentage points. But what de-
termines whether "community" interest rates settle at the higher level
or the lower one? The effects on other objectives may be very different.
Economic growth will be inhibited more in the first case than in the
second.
This would be of secondary importance if all countries had many
policy instruments at their disposal. Each country could compensate
for any deleterious effects on domestic objectives arising from the value
of instruments determined predominantly by the community as a
whole. But as we already noted, the number of instruments and the
range of values they can assume are often sharply limited by tradition
or law. Indeed, it is highly likely that at any point in time a country
will have at its disposal only the minimum number of policy instru-
ments that it needs to satisfy important domestic political demands.
Policy instruments affect the welfare of particular members of the
16. This must be qualified to the extent that interest rates influence total savings in
two countries.
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community as well as national economic objectives, so their use will be
resisted. Public expectation is that certain measures, while theoretically
conceivable, will in practice not be used. Any attempt to invoke them
therefore meets stiff resistance.' 7
The values which policy instruments take on in the community of
nations, and the process by which those values are reached, are therefore
of strong interest to the individual nations. They may not have sufficient
domestic flexibility to offset the damaging effects of policy instruments
which are forced to an inappropriate level by international competition
among governments. As a result, greater international integration can
force choices among national objectives which otherwise would all be
attainable.
There are occasions in which most or even all members of the
international community will find themselves worse off. The competi-
tive devaluations and tariff wars of the interwar period offer the most
striking examples; many of the proscriptions in the GATT and the
IMF Articles of Agreement are designed to avoid a repetition of those
events.
But competition among policies was not thereby banished on all
fronts. For example, interest rates shot upward in 1965 and 1966 to
levels one to two percentage points higher than those which had pre-
vailed in most countries in 1964. Some of the increases were designed
to curb domestic demand; others were defensive, to limit capital out-
flow. Even after domestic economies had cooled down, it took a
dramatic meeting of finance ministers at Checquers, England, in early
1967, to reverse the process. Four other types of policy instruments
having these characteristics have been used in the effort to strengthen
the balance of payments of various countries: restrictions on govern-
ment procurement, government-sponsored export promotion, tax in-
centives to domestic investment, and changes in domestic tax structure.
The United States, faced with large payments deficits during the early
sixties, made or considered moves in all of these areas; but in each case
there was ample precedent abroad for doing so.
Government purchases for government use are specifically excluded
from coverage by the GATT rules governing international trade.28
17. The inflexibility of potential policy instruments is summed up in the adage. "Any
old tax is a good tax." Changes in taxes not only affect marginal decisions-that may be
the objective-but also capital values which the market place has adjusted to allow for the
old tax. Thus changes in taxes often result in capital gains for some and capital losses for
others.
18. GATr, Art. XVII(2).
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The result is that a conspicuously small proportion of government pur-
chases, by any government, is from foreign suppliers who compete with
domestic producers. In the United States the Buy American provision-
which since 1954 officially gives preferential treatment of six to twelve
per cent (in addition to tariffs) to domestic over foreign competitors
for the Government's custom-has existed since the 1930's. But in 1962
a number of government agencies, including most importantly the
Department of Defense, raised the preference accorded to domestic
suppliers as high as 50 per cent.19 Foreign aid expenditures by the
American government are even more restricted. Starting with develop-
ment loans in 1959, such expenditures were tied increasingly to pur-
chases in the United States, until by 1965 only a limited class of ex-
penditures was not so tied, regardless of the price advantages offered
by foreign suppliers.
The government procurement practices of other countries are more
difficult to document, since most governments do not require open
bidding on government purchases with well-publicized preferences for
domestic producers, such as those found in the Buy American pro-
visions. Many countries follow the practice of tying foreign assistance,
either by law or by skillful selection of projects and recipient countries,
to purchases from the donor country. This is as true for those donors
with fully employed economies as for those with excess capacity and
unemployment-even though tying is far less effective in the former
case, and merely stimulates additional imports-and it is as true for
donor countries in balance of payments surplus as for those in deficit.
Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom tie the bulk of their foreign
assistance, and France ties some expenditures. France and the Nether-
lands give virtually all of their foreign assistance to colonial or former
colonial areas, where de facto aid-tying takes place through long-estab.
lished trading firms. German aid often originates with requests from
prospective exporters who have found projects in recipient countries
eligible for foreign assistance by German criteria.2 0
Many of these practices, of course, arise not only from balance of
19. The Department of Defense also introduced, and then raised, a margin of prefer.
ence to American suppliers for its procurement for use by American forces abroad, which
procurement was not subject to the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. § 10). The change added
an average of 26 per cent to the budgetary cost of those items shifted from overseas to
domestic procurement. See testimony of Charles Hitch, Comptroller of the Defense Depart.
ment, Hearings on Balance of Payments Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1965).
20. On national practices and their economic effects, see Cooper, External Assistance
and the Balance of Payments Donor Countries, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 46/141, Vol. V, at
260-73 (1965).
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payments considerations but also from protectionist sentiment. Domes-
tic producers apply strong political pressures on their governments to
buy at home-the more so when the goods are to be "given away." But
weakness in the balance of payments often strengthens their arguments
and increases public acceptability of such restrictive measures.21
Government activities are not solely restrictive of trade. On the con-
trary, a second range of practices involves all kinds of schemes, except
direct subsidies proscribed by GATT, to promote exports of goods and
services. Governments sponsor trade fairs, product exhibitions, and
other advertisements for the products of their exporters; they insure
commercial and so-called non-commercial risks involved in exporting;
and they often help to finance exports directly. No major industrial
trading nation can be found without a government or government-
sponsored agency for insuring and/or extending credit for exports.
Some countries, such as France and Italy, give especially favorable
treatment to export paper in their banking systems or at their central
banks. And export credit is often exempt from general credit limitations
to restrict domestic demand. All of these measures really subsidize ex-
ports, although it is often impossible to identify the amount of the
subsidy to any particular sale.
The United States established the U.S. Travel Service in 1961 to
attract foreign tourists to the United States. European governments
have been aiding tourism much longer, and each year spend substantial
amounts for the purpose of attracting foreign tourists. Moreover, ex-
penditure for tourist promotion has been growing rapidly, doubling
every two to four years. In addition to straightfonard publicity, most
European countries subsidize the hotel industry either through pref-
erential tax treatment or through low-interest or government-guaran-
teed loans.22 In most countries these programs date from the late fifties
or the early sixties.
Subsidies to domestic investment is the third area in which govern-
ments have moved to improve their international payments positions.
Investment subsidies for manufacturing and agriculture improve the
competitiveness of a country's products in world markets. Some coun-
tries give direct tax incentives to new investment in plant and equip-
ment, such as the investment tax credit of 7 per cent adopted by the
United States in 1962 and the 30 per cent investment allowance in the
21. "When the European common market is finally established, member governments
will be obliged to give equal access to suppliers throughout the EEC.
22. ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNoMIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPEN'T, TovRzu iN O.E.C.D.
MAiman CouNTRiEs 22 and Annex I (1963).
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United Kingdom (in early 1966 the latter was also converted into a
direct grant of 20 per cent of expenditures on new plant and equip-
ment). Japan permits greatly accelerated depreciation of assets. A
rough impression of the influence of these arrangements can be
gained from Table 1, which indicates the speed with which new
equipment can be written off, taking into account investment allow-
ances and tax credits. Table 2 indicates the substantial incentive to
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF INVESTMENT IN NEW PLANT AND MACHINERY ALLOWED
TO BE WRITrEN OFF FOR TAX PuRPOsEs
Cumulative Total
In First Year By Fifth Year over asset life
Belgium 22 92 n.a.
Canada 30 71 100
France 25 76 100
Germany, F.R. 20 67 100
Italy 25 100 n.a.
Japan 43 68 n.a.
Netherlands 26 86 110
Sweden 30 100 100
United Kingdoma 55 91 IS0
United Statesb 29 78 114
a Including an investment allowance of 30 per cent.
b Including an estimate for the effect of an investment tax credit of 7 per cent.
Source: REPORT OF THE COMMITE. ON TURNOVER TAXATION, Cmnd. No. 2300, at 52 (1964),
Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1962, Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., at 82 (1962).
TABLE 2
STATUTORY AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
Earnings Fully Retained Earnings Fully Distributed
Statutory Rate Effective Ratea Statutory Rate Effective Ratea
Belgium 30 30 30 30
France 50 46 50 46
Germany, F.R. 56 53 32 30
Italy 36 32 15 13
Luxembourg 45 32 45 32
Netherlands 45 37 35 29
United Kingdom 54 39 24 18
a Computed on the basis of straight line depredation on the assumption of a constant
before tax rate of return of 20 per cent over the life of the investment and a market rate
of interest of 5 per cent.
Source: Richman, Depreciation and the Measurement of Effective Profits Tax Rates in
the European Common Market and United Kingdom, 17 NAT'L TAx J. 90 (1964).
invest which accelerated depreciation and investment allowances pro-
vide in some countries by reducing corporate profits taxes.
Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, government subsidy for
domestic investment is similar to a devaluation of the currency in that
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it improves the cost competitiveness both of the country's export
products and of its products which compete with imports.2
Subsidies to investment are obviously motivated by considerations
extending well beyond the balance of payments; economic growth has
become a target of economic policy in its own right, partly for political
and strategic reasons (arising in part from the "economic race" with the
Soviet Bloc), partly because rising standards of living are universally
desired. But balance of payments considerations do play an important
role in the decision to inaugurate investment incentives. Britain for
years has emphasized the need to enlarge and improve its capital stock
to compete more effectively in world markets. And former U.S. Secre-
tary of the Treasury Dillon, testifying on behalf of the U.S. investment
tax credit in 1962, argued that the measure was required "if U.S.
business firms are to be placed on substantially equal footing with
their foreign competitors in this respect. It is essential," he said, "to
our competitive position in markets both here at home and abroad, that
American industry be put on the same basis as foreign industry. Unless
this is done, increased imports and decreased exports will unnecessarily
add to the burden of our balance of payments deficit."2
Changes in the structure of domestic taxation, and in particular the
"mix" between direct and indirect taxes, constitutes a fourth area in
which governments have moved, or have been tempted to move, to
improve their national trade positions. GATT rules prohibiting ex-
port subsidies have been interpreted to preclude remission of direct
taxes on exports but to permit remission of indirect taxes. Thus taxes
on the corporate profits arising from export cannot be rebated, but
manufacturers' excise taxes or turnover taxes can. Similarly, countries
are permitted to levy indirect taxes, but not direct taxes, on imports.
Because of this asymmetry in border tax adjustment, it is possible under
fixed exchange rates for a country to stimulate exports and impede
imports by shifting its tax structure from direct taxes to indirect taxes,
provided that direct taxes affect prices.
The GATT rule is based on the classical economic assumption that
indirect taxes are shifted entirely to the purchaser, while direct taxes
28. Investment subsidies differ from straightforward currency devaluation, however, in
that the improvement in competitiveness varies from industry to industry according to
the capital-intensity of the productive process, and in general they encourage the use of
more capital intensive methods of production.
24. Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2nd
Sess., pt. 1, at 83 (1962). It is noteworthy, moreover, that investment incentives are usually
directed at the manufacturing industries, e.g., those whose goods are important in inter.
national trade. An inmportant exception to this pro.trade bias in some countries is hous-
ing.
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are not shifted at all, being absorbed entirely (in the case of the corpo-
rate profits tax) by the firm. Recent work in the field of public finance
suggests, however, that there may be much less difference in the price
effects of, say, corporate profits taxes and manufacturers' excise taxes
than was once thought to be the case.25 To the extent that indirect taxes
are partially absorbed by the producer, or that profits taxes are par-
tially shifted forward to the consumer, the GATT rules regarding
border treatment of national taxes allow some "subsidy" to exports
and a country can improve its trade position by switching from cor-
porate profits taxes to excise or turnover taxes.
Some countries have made tax changes in this direction, and others
have been urged to do so. Sweden reduced its income tax and imposed
a general sales tax in 1960; in mid-1964 Italy reduced payroll taxes
(which are not rebatable) and, to recoup the revenue, increased turn-
over taxes (which are rebatable). The German government in 1967
approved a change from a turnover to a value-added tax which will
improve the export competitiveness of German products; 20 and Britain
has been periodically urged to increase its indirect taxes and lower
the direct corporate taxes, although a special committee set up to ex-
amine the matter rejected the proposed change.27 Similar changes have
been proposed for the United States.
Once again, many considerations have influenced these proposals; in
some cases there may be powerful arguments for making the change
regardless of the effects on the balance of payments. But it is interesting
to note that these proposals have come alive only since the late 1950's,
as international competition has stiffened, and that improvement in
the trade balance is often mentioned explicitly as an important reason
for making the change. The Committee for Economic Development
has stated, for example, that "a major advantage of a general excise
tax [over a corporate profits tax] is that it would tend to improve the
ability of the United States to compete with others in world markets,"
and it goes on to argue that the United States must "equalize" its tax
25. M. KRZYZANIAK &- R. MUSGRAVE, TnE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX
chs. 6, 8 (1963); Stockfish, On the Obsolescence of Incidence, 14 PuBLIc FAN= 125-48
(1959).
26. Because rebates under the turnover tax, due to complications in calculating the
exact burden of the tax on each commodity, are lower than the values of rebates-and
import levies-that would be permissible under the GATT rules.
27. REPORT OF THE CoiMrrrE ON TuRNovER TAXATiON, CMIND. No. 2300 (1964). In
late 1964, however, Britain did increase tax rebates on exports by extending the definition
of rebatable excises to include taxes on fuels and office supplies and equipment. The
rebates were estimated at about 3 per cent of the value of affected exports.
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structure with that of the Common Market as tariffs between the two
trading areas are reduced.28
All of these policy measures have a common characteristic. Taken by
one country alone, each represents a concealed devaluation of the
currency, at least with respect to a selected class of transactions. But
like devaluation, these measures are effective only if other countries do
not respond in kind. To each country, tying foreign aid and giving
preference to domestic producers in government procurement may
appear to offer a means to improve the balance of payments; and indeed
in the short run it may do so. But if all countries follow the same
practices, the benefit to each is much reduced and some countries will
have their payments positions worsened as a result. In the meantime,
the total real value of foreign aid has been reduced by reliance on high
cost suppliers, and inefficient production has been fostered.
The same thing is true of the other measures discussed. General
adoption of export promotion schemes and government-sponsored
tourist publicity will surely have a much greater effect on the total
level of world exports and tourism than on the payments position of
any one country, since the measures will largely cancel one another and
leave only residual effects on the balance of payments. Similarly, if all
countries adopt special tax incentives for domestic investment, the net
improvement in competitiveness-which depends as much on incen-
tives abroad as on those at home-will be haphazard and unpredictable.
The principal effect may well be not on any one country's balance of
payments position but on the total investment and the rate of growth
in the world economy at large-so long as these effects are not nullified
by a competitive rise in long-term interest rates! Finally, an effort to
raise exports and impede imports through changes in domestic tax
structure may have little overall effect on foreign trade and leave
countries with tax structures which many would prefer not to have.
At any point in time there are often cogent and persuasive argu-
ments for introducing one or more of these measures to improve the
balance of payments. If other countries did not respond in kind, the
desired improvement would be forthcoming. But if other coun-
tries act likewise, the measures largely cancel out. Not only is the
purpose of the move nullified, but all countries may find themselves
worse off in terms of their other objectives. As a rule, individual coun-
tries cannot act unilaterally without inviting reaction. If they are
28. CoNnn-E r FOR EcoNomc DEvELwr-N'r, RMUCMN TAX RA'rs roR PlODL.cnoN
AND GRowm 39-40 (1962).
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successful, they are quickly emulated by their neighbors, so that the
initial gains are transitory at best. Countries often must act in self-
defense, in response to the behavior of their trading partners. This is
particularly so when measures to reduce one country's deficit do not
reduce the surpluses of the surplus countries but increase the deficit of
another deficit country or move countries in balance into deficit. These
third countries then feel compelled to respond defensively and their
actions in turn increase the deficit of the initial country. Moreover,
many of the measures thus taken are difficult to reverse-countries do
not readily contract export credit programs or lengthen the periods of
depreciation allowable for tax purposes. 20
Today there is little blatant competition among policies, such as the
round of tariff increases in the late twenties and the competitive de-
preciations of the early thirties. But more subtle and sophisticated
methods can substitute, albeit imperfectly, for currency depreciation.
Taken in sequence by different countries, these measures produce a
kind of ratchet effect. We then have a series of competitive deprecia-
tions in disguise.
In this case it is balance of payments difficulties, actual or feared,
which give rise to the undesirable competition in policies. Competition
for the location of industry can also weaken economic policy in the
area of regulation and taxation, due to the mobility of business. To
attract new firms or to keep the firms they have, local authorities may
eschew tax or regulatory measures which in the view of the authorities
would benefit the community as a whole, but for the possibility of
driving away investment.
National governments have not yet engaged in a scramble to adjust
their policies to be most attractive to foreign-owned business firms; on
the contrary, a number of countries are concerned about the amount
of foreign control already present. Differences in taxation and other
measures relating to business activity do, however, affect international
corporate location, and some beginnings of national competition for
this location can be seen. Luxembourg liberalized its depreciation
allowances and offered an investment allowance in 1962 in what ap-
peared to be a deliberate move to attract foreign investment for opera-
tions throughout the European Common Market. Belgium and the
29. There are some exceptions. Measures which are subject to a time limitation can
be allowed to lapse. As an anti-inflationary measure, Germany finally permitted its provl.
sions for accelerated depreciation to lapse in 1960-after nine years of large payments
surpluses.
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Swiss cantons have also adopted tax and other features designed to
attract foreign enterprise.30
Policy Competition Within the United States
This intrusion of outside considerations on "domestic" policies is a
familiar phenomenon to Americans, who can observe at close hand
relationships among the States of the Union. The United States repre-
sents, by itself, a large and highly integrated trading economy. Under
the Federal system, governmental entities with important responsibil-
ities are often much smaller than the regional "economies" which they
serve. Though nominally sovereign in many areas, the states are in fact
closely circumscribed in what they can do, and they are sometimes com-
pelled in self-defense to take repugnant measures. Corporate regulation
and tax policy both illustrate this process.
State corporation laws were originally the most popular and effective
way of regulating incorporated businesses.3' In 1886, for example,
Massachusetts passed new corporation statutes designed to prevent fraud
or mismanagement by firms incorporated in the state. The directors
and officers of Massachusetts corporations were made personally liable
to creditors if the firms' debts exceeded their capital. The valuation of
new stock had to be approved by the State Commissioner of Corpora-
tions. So long as similar laws prevailed in other industrial states, Massa-
chusetts corporations had little to gain from incorporating elsewhere.
The system of corporate regulation through state law became un-
stable during the following two decades. First New Jersey, then Dela-
ware began to exploit the provisions in the U.S. Constitution prohibit-
ing impediments to interstate commerce and requiring that contracts
made in any state be honored in any other state. New Jersey liberalized
its laws of incorporation in 1896 by allowing new stock valuation to be
entirely at the discretion of the corporation directors; it had earlier
permitted debts to exceed capitalization. Both provisions laid the basis
for the Standard Oil Company and other giant firms incorporated in
New Jersey. The state benefitted from a modest tax on the value of
corporate capital.
New Jersey's bid for corporations undermined the regulatory corpo-
30. Furthermore, the relaxation in France's tough policy on foreign investment may
have been dictated in large measure by the prospect of losing investment to other members
of the EEC which would nonetheless have free access to the French market.
31. This history is taken largely from Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business
Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 27 HRAv. L. REv. 32-35 (1937).
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ration laws of other states. Massachusetts corporations, for example,
could circumvent regulation simply by incorporating in New Jersey,
and a strict Massachusetts law would fail in its purpose. In 1902 a
special Massachusetts commission reported "a general practice" of
organizing corporations outside Massachusetts to do business within the
state. The commission drafted a new, permissive corporation law which
was enacted virtually without change a year later. The restrictions of
1886 were largely eliminated.
In a series of laws starting in the first decade of the twentieth century
Delaware relaxed greatly its restrictions on incorporation, and in the
end maintained virtually no requirements regarding the capital struc-
ture of a corporation registered in the state. Directors were not closely
bound by their charters in issuing new stock. Illinois had tried to police
the capital structure of corporations, but in 1933 it virtually adopted
the latest Delaware revisions of 1927 and 1929, illustrating a kind of
Gresham's Law in corporate regulation. In the same year, however,
the federal government undertook much greater responsibility for
regulating public stock issues under the Securities and Exchange Act.
State taxation provides a second illustration of the severe constraints
imposed on the states by close competition with their neighbors. Wide
taxing powers are nominally reserved to the states. Yet while authorities
in state taxation complain bitterly about the large differences in tax
structure and tax treatment of business income and commodities from
state to state, these differences are very narrow compared with those
between countries. Commodity taxation is predominantly at the retail
level-the administratively simpler manufacturers' excise tax is virtu-
ally non-existent-and the rates are very close to one another, partic-
ularly between contiguous states. State taxation of corporate income also
tends to be much the same from state to state, and differences in rates,
coverage, and definition of taxable income have narrowed over time. 2
The reasons for increasing uniformity are obvious enough. The free-
dom of commodities, capital, and persons to move from state to state
without legal impediment, and the ease with which they do so, reduces
greatly the scope for wide differences in tax treatment since both pur-
chasers and sellers will leave the high tax states. A striking example of
the pressures toward uniformity is provided by North Carolina's adop-
tion in 1957 of a new tax law which changed the basis for calculating
32. See SPECIAL SUBCOMA. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE Or THE
Com'm. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. Rep. No. 1480,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-136 (1964). See also J. 'MAXWELL, THE FIsCAL, ImPAcT oF rEDERALisM
IN THE UNITED STATES (1946) especially Ch. XIII.
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state taxes on the net income of corporations engaged in interstate
commerce. The new law had the effect of reducing the tax burden on
out-of state corporations making interstate sales from bases in North
Carolina and, moreover, it relieved in-state corporations from paying
North Carolina income taxes on income derived from out-of-state
sales.33 The tax change was frankly designed "to encourage more in-
dustry to locate and expand in the State."34 Within three years South
Carolina and Virginia had adopted essentially the same formula, as
the governor of South Carolina explained, "to keep competitive."3 5
Under this pressure of acute competition for industry, measures are
taken which benefit industrial firms but which, since most states are
following similar practices, may not much affect the actual location of
industry. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are perennial cries
for greater coordination of state taxation, and even for uniformity. In
1957 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved a model Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act which would eliminate the pointless competition among states in
their tax laws. But to date only three states have adopted the approved
act in its entirety, and even then not without modifications; 30 no state
acting alone has much incentive to adopt it. Hence, even state tax
commissioners and others who might be supposed to be jealous of
states' rights have called on the federal government to impose uni-
formity on state taxation of corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce (which means in effect virtually all direct taxes on business).3 7
A noteworthy feature of this competition among the states is that
much of it arises from the mobility of business. Taxation and regula-
tory activities are less effective if the range of feasible business locations
33. The first of these two features recalls some of the tax privileges of foreign cor-
porations setting up sales offices in Switzerland. The second, amounting to a remission
of direct taxes on export sales, would at the international level be a dear violation of
GATT rules.
34. Advertisement in N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1957.
35. STATE TAxATiON or INTERsTATE CommERCE, supra note 32, at 123-26.
36. Id. 133.
37. The situation is actually somewhat more complicated than this implies. States, faced
with rapidly increasing needs for revenue, widened their business taxes considerably during
the fifties to include a number of taxes touching significantly on interstate commerce. In
1959 the Supreme Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450 (1959), upheld the right of Minnesota to tax the net income of an out-of-state
business arising from sales in the state. A series of decisions on related cases made clear
the wide taxing powers of the states. The business community was alarmed, and in late
1959 Congress passed a law limiting the rights of states to tax interstate commerce. Many
states resented the limitation on their taxing powers, but--caught between rising revenue
needs and competition with other states-urged the Congress to legislate uniform standards
for defining tax base, apportioning income, etc. See Hearings on State Income Taxation
of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations Before a Special Subconm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 367 (1961).
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exceeds the jurisdiction of the taxing or regulatory authorities. State
regulatory laws began to lose effect around the turn of the century
when American corporations increasingly became truly national in
their operations.
To some extent, however, similar problems arise from mobility of
persons. Especially when a metropolitan area is made up of several
governmental jurisdictions, persons working in the area can choose to
live where taxes are lowest even while enjoying the public benefits of
the central city.
In Summary
In a highly integrated economic area which surpasses in size the
jurisdiction of governments, each group of policy-makers is subject to
such strong interactions with the surrounding area that the constraints
on its actions become very severe. Indeed, in the hypothetically limit-
ing case, these constraints determine entirely the course of action each
jurisdiction must take. The region-or the nation-in a highly inte-
grated economy becomes analogous to the perfect competitor-or at
best the oligopolist-in a market economy. The range of choice it has,
consistent with economic survival, is very small; for the most part it
simply adapts its behavior to stimuli from outside. Awareness of the
high interactions will eventually inhibit action.
A. C. Pigou and John Maynard Keynes pointed out long ago that the
sum of individual decisions by consumers and producers may not always
be optimal for society as a whole (and hence for its members), even
though its members may be acting individually on entirely rational
grounds. 38 Some kind of collective action is therefore required to pro-
duce an optimal outcome.
The same can be true among nations, or among regions within a
nation, if the interactions among their decisions are sufficiently strong.
One jurisdiction gropes for new instruments in an attempt to improve
its position. If it succeeds, others follow and there is a competition in
policies which defeats everyone's objectives and in fact can even lead
all participants away from their national or local objectives, like the
members of a crowd rising to their tip-toes to see a parade better but in
the end merely standing uncomfortably on their tip-toes.8 9
38. A. Pioou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932). This was also the central underlying
message of J. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EmPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936).
39. A recent illustration of this, drawn from the United States, is provided by the
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An invisible hand seems to be working in economic policy as well
as in the market place. Competition in the market place is alleged to
lead to the most efficient allocation of resources. Whatever the merits
of this claim, we can be much less confident that competition among
policies will be optimal. Governments seek many ends, not the efficient
allocation of resources alone; and the process of policy competition
can certainly thwart some of those objectives.
Existing rules of international behavior as set forth in GATT and in
the IMF Agreement do limit the use of direct and straightforward
means of policy competition such as open export subsidies and multiple
exchange rates, and they therefore slow the process of policy competi-
tion since the more subtle and sophisticated methods-loopholes in
growing use by States and municipalities of their privilege to float tax-exempt securities
for the purpose of raising funds for new businesses locating there. This practice was
used by only three states as recently as 1956, with such issues totalling less than $2 million;
but by 1966 these issues had been made in 28 states and exceeded $500 million. As the
process spreads, the actual effect on the location of industry diminishes, and the net effect
illbe simply to erode the federal corporate tax base and to raise interest charges on all
tax-free state and municipal securities, thus in the end hurting the protagonists in the
process.
A simple game offers a suggestive if inexact analogy to the consequences of policy com-
petition. Consider a "game" in which each of two persons must name an even number be-
tween two and ten. If they name the same number, each player receives half of that num-
ber. If they name different numbers, the player naming the lower number wins the
number he named; the other player wins nothing. The "payoff matrix" for either player
looks like this:
Number chosen Number chosen
by one player by the other player
2 4 6 8 10
2 1 2 2 2 2
4 0 2 4 4 4
6 0 0 3 6 6
8 0 0 0 4 8
10 0 0 0 0 5
Maximum joint gains are reached if both players choose ten; in that case each of them
wins five. But for each player the choice of "eight! dominates the choice of "ten" in the
sense that the payoff is sometimes higher and is never lower, no matter what the other
player chooses. If the choice of "ten" is ruled out by both pla)ers on these grounds, choice
of "sinx" then dominates the choice of "eight" by reasoning similar to that above; and so
on, until both players end up choosing "two" as the only safe strategy yielding some sure
payoff.
The mutual gains from cooperation are obvious in this case, and should be obvious to
both players. The temptation to cheat will always be present, but if the game is played
again and again the long-run loss from deviating from a jointly agreed choice of "ten"
should induce both players to stick to their agreement. If, however, this kind of game is
extended to include many players-each player naming the lowest number shares the re-
ward with others who do so, but wins nothing if someone else has named a lower number
-any one player may feel he can violate the agreed conventions to his own benefit with-
out inducing retaliatory action by all the others. Since all the participants may reason in
this way, all may be made worse off than necessary.
International trade and financial policies have something of this character: if all the
other players adhere to the rules which benefit all, any one of them may gain by deviat-
ing from them, and therein lies the risk of unraveling. The rules will be workable only if
all play by them.
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GATT and the IMF Agreement-usually involve strong domestic con-
siderations which delay their implementation. But existing rules do
not fully accomplish the aim of preventing self-defeating policy com-
petition and of freeing domestic policy measures to pursue largely
domestic objectives. Moreover, the pressures on domestic policy are
likely to become greater as the world economy becomes more interde-
pendent. Freedom of action in economic policy formation can be lost
through the need for each country to compete in policies with its
competitors in commerce.
To minimize adverse effects from this competition, countries can
coordinate closely their national economic policies, attempting to
define and reach an optimum combination of policies for the com-
munity as a whole. This route involves extensive "internationalization"
of the process of economic policy-making, transferring this govern-
mental function to the larger integrated area.40
Alternatively, countries can attempt to remove the major source of
pressure on their actions-deleterious effects on their international
payments positions-by providing each country with ample liquidity to
finance any deficit and allowing it to go its own way. Or this goal can be
accomplished by reversing the process of economic integration, artifi-
cially breaking down or reducing the numerous economic links be-
tween countries. While some movement can be seen on all three of
these fronts, actions in the United States and Europe in the mid-sixties
seemed dangerously pointed toward the third alternative.
40. The same is true for regulation and taxation as well as balance of payment policies,
A governmental unit spanning a territory which equals or exceeds the locational domain
of the firm can make and enforce regulations without inviting socially undesirable reloca-
tion of industry. As the locational domains of business firms increase, it is necessary also
for the jurisdictions of governments to increase correspondingly-at least in some dimen-
sions-if subsequent "policy competition" among governments is not to result in practices
and policies which are socially sub-optimal. Water and air pollution control provide topi-
cal examples. It is this, rather than the narrower question of possible misallocation of
resources, which suggests that the pressure for "harmonization" of policies-i.e., joint
decisions-makes sense.
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